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Although Switzerland has one of the world's largest occupational pension systems, empirical literature on Swiss pension fund governance is almost nonexisting. To this end, the only study that empirically investigates the relationship between pension fund governance and investment performance in Switzerland is provided by AMMANN and ZINGG (2010) . To proxy governance quality, the authors employ a questionnaire that asks Swiss pension fund executives about objectively measurable criteria that are based on verifiable facts. While they find a positive relationship between governance and performance, their study is confined to a very narrow time window and to only one performance measure: the "net value added". This study therefore fills the gap in the literature and extends the work of AMMANN and ZINGG (2010) in three important ways: First, we investigate to what extent governance factors affect performance indirectly through asset allocation decisions. Second, our investigation takes into account the scope of the pension funds' risk management practices, which have become of central interest in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Third, we use a much greater variety of investment performance measures including risk-adjusted return measures as well as relative performance measures (i.e., benchmark deviations). Additionally, we extend the return examination window to three years, using annual investment performance data from 2010 to 2012. We hence contribute to both the empirical literature on pension fund governance and the literature on the objective evaluation of such governance structures in general.
Since neither historical performance data nor data about the governance structures of Swiss pension funds is publicly available, we collect the information via a proprietary survey. We thereby focus on six different governance areas: I) organisational design, 2) management incentives, 3) target setting and investment strategy, 4) investment processes, 5) risk management, and 6) managerial transparency. Our proprietary dataset contains data from 139 entities, covering almost 43o/o of total assets of the Swiss pension universe as of the end of 2012. While previous studies have measured pension fund governance quality mostly with rather subjective measures (e.g., such as self-perceptions or opinions of senior managers, trustees or CEOs), our survey solely includes assessment criteria that are based on objectively quantifiable facts. To assess the sample plans' governance structures in the most objective way, we create the Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score (G-SCORE). The G-SCORE consists of 6 individual sub-scores that cover the above-defined governance areas and is based on the answers of the responding entities. To relate governance to investment performance, we run multivariate regressions using four different portfolio performance metrics as dependent variables. We thereby control for institutional factors such as fund size, fund type, plan model, legal form, risk coverage, internal cost structures and the ratio of active plan members to pension beneficiaries.
Our analysis shows that pension fund governance is positively related to the surveyed plans' realised performance of the years 2010-2012. We find that the pension funds of the top G-SCORE quartile outperform those of the bottom quartile by approximately 1 o/o in terms of average excess returns and passive benchmark deviation. Our investigation furthermore indicates that asset allocation decisions are mainly independent of the prevailing pension fund governance structures, but rather linked to institutional factors (e.g., such as fund size or legal form).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we develop an objective governance metric for Swiss occupational pension plans: the Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score (G-SCORE). section 3 explains the performance metrics that are used for the empirical analysis. section 4 presents the econometric model and the control variables beyond governance. Section 5 evaluates the current governance state of the pension funds in our sample and describes the results of the survey. Section 6 presents the empirical findings while section 7 concludes the main results.
Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score (G-SCORE)
To evaluate pension fund governance structures objectively and comprehensively, we develop the Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score (G-SCORE). The G-SCORE is methodologically related to corporate governance indices that aggregate individual firm governance attributes cumulatively (e.g., also see ScHMID, 2011, 2013; BEBCHUCK and CoHEN, 2005; BEBCHUCK, CoHEN, and FERRELL, 2008; BROWN and CAYLOR, 2006; GoM-PERS, IsHII, and METRICK, 2003) . It draws from previous empirical research findings and, to some extent, best-practice considerations from the academic literature. While we do not claim that the theoretical literature recommendations are necessarily in line with "good" governance due to contradictory empirical evidence for certain score components, we take them as practical reference points for our valuation framework. Although many of the score constituents might theoretically be desirable from a governance point of view, we do not state that occupational pension funds should apply or pursue them in order to improve their governance quality. Neither do we postulate how governance structures should optimally look like. In fact, some of the elements Is Governance Related to Investment Performance and Asset Allocation? 297 that are included in our scoring model are discussed rather controversially in the literature since empirical evidence is contradictory. This particularly pertains to components such as the pursuit of active tactical asset allocation and the design of compensation structures for trustee board members. Our study instead aims at detecting those factors that are potentially related to plan performance and asset allocation decisions.
While previous authors have proxied governance quality with rather subjective metrics, we constrain ourselves to entirely objective factors that are investigated by means of a standardised survey which was sent by mail to Swiss occupational pension funds. For each answer that is deemed to be theoretically desirable from a governance point of view, a pension fund receives 1 point on the G-SCORE. Otherwise, a fund receives 0 points. Consequently, a high score is associated with a comprehensive or "theoretically desirable" governance structure.
Taking a holistic view on pension fund governance, we create 6 sub-scores as well as an overall composite score. The 6 sub-scores evaluate pension fund governance in terms of their organisational design (ORGA Score), management objectives setting (MANO Score), target setting and investment strategy definition (TSIS Score), investment processes (INVP Score), risk management procedures (RIMA Score), and the degree of managerial transparency (MOTR Score). The composite G-SCORE is computed as the sum of all individual sub-scores. The items included in the 6 sub-scores are shown below. The detailed explanations about the construction of the 6 sub-scores are comprehensively described in the appendix of this paper.
The first sub-score assesses a pension fund's governance structure with respect to its organisational setup and responsibility allocation. Our Organisation Score (ORGA) can assume values between 0 and 10. A high score indicates a high degree of organisational coherence. Table 1 shows the detailed composition of the ORGA Score.
The second sub-score evaluates a pension fund's governance structure with respect to objectives setting and management incentive design. Our Management Objectives Score (MANO) has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 7, whereby a high score indicates a high degree of objectives and incentives setting. Table 2 shows the detailed composition of the MANO Score.
The third sub-score evaluates a pension fund's governance structure with respect to its target setting and investment strategy definition process. The TSIS Score can assume values between 0 and 10. A high score indicates a highly structured approach regarding target setting and investment strategy design. Table 3 shows the detailed composition of the Target Setting and Investment Strategy Score. Notes: The Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score is divided into 6 sub-scores. The Organisation Score (ORGA) evaluates a pension fund's organisational form and coherence. It ranges from 0 to 10 whereby a high score indicates a high degree of organisational coherence and sound responsibility allocation. Notes: The Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score is divided into 6 sub-scores. The Target Setting and Investment Strategy Score (TSIS) evaluates a pension fund's quality in terms of target setting and investment strategy design. It ranges from 0 to 10 whereby a higher score indicates a higher quality in terms of target setting and systematic investment strategy definition.
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The fourth sub-score evaluates a pension fund's governance structure with respect to its asset management processes. The Investment Process Score (INVP) can assume values between 0 and 10. A high score indicates a highly structured investment management process. Table 4 shows the detailed composition of the INVP Score.
The fifth sub-score evaluates a pension fund's risk management framework. A pension fund can obtain a minimum of 0 points and a maximum of 15 points in this category. A high score indicates a comprehensive risk management design. Table 5 shows the detailed composition of the RIMA Score.
The sixth and final sub-score evaluates a pension fund's governance with respect to its performance monitoring process and degree of managerial transparency. The Monitoring and Transparency Score (MOTR) can assume values between 0 and 8. A high score indicates a high monitoring quality and a high degree of transparency. Table 6 shows the detailed composition of the MOTR Score. Process Score (INVP) evaluates a pension fund's governance structure in terms of its asset management processes. It ranges from 0 to 10 whereby a higher score indicates a higher investment process quality. All mandates of board members disclosed in the annual report Information concept for plan members about shareholder voting rights Annual report available on the internet 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 8 Notes: The Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score is divided into 6 sub-scores. The Monitoring and Transparency Score (MOTR) evaluates a pension fund's governance structure in terms of its monitoring process and its degree of managerial transparency. It ranges from 0 to 8 whereby a higher score indicates a higher monitoring quality and transparency degree. 302 AMMANN I EHMANN
Pension Fund Performance Measures
Measuring the performance of pension portfolios is more complicated than of other collective investment vehicles. First, certain metrics are not suitable for pension plans, particularly when a pension fund manager outsources all or part of the portfolio allocation to external asset managers. Jensen's alpha 1 is such an example. Second, even if alpha was used as performance measure, multifactor models to estimate alpha would be very difficult to employ due to the vast heterogeneity of the funds' asset allocations and the multitude of their risk factors. Moreover, we do not have a performance data time series for Swiss pension funds with which an alpha could be reasonably estimated. Therefore, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of pension fund performance, we draw on four different quantitative measures. Those are explained below:
To obtain a first overview of the plan performance on a non-risk-adjusted basis, we compute geometric mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate net of costs over the years -2012 . In the following, this 3-year time period is referred to as the evaluation period. The risk-free rate is proxied by the average yield of 1 0-year Swiss confederation bonds.
To measure the value added by active asset management, we compare a pension fund's return net of portfolio management fees (Rpp) against the return of a passively implemented benchmark strategy (RPB) . A positive deviation from the benchmark indicates superior portfolio management, whereas a negative deviation indicates an underperformance relative to the passive strategy. The benchmark that we use for this analysis is based on standard market indices proxying major asset classes and the relative weights of the effective asset allocations as reported by the pension funds in our sample as of the end of 2012. In order to compare a pension fund's return against the benchmark return, we compute an individual allocation benchmark for each fund in the sample by multiplying the asset allocation weights with the annual returns of each asset class index. The detailed breakdown of the benchmark indices for each asset class is shown in Appendix 1. Since the effective asset allocations of Swiss pension funds have not changed fundamentally over the last three years, we assume the weights to remain constant during the evaluation period 2 • To capture the total out-or underperformance of the kth fund in this period, we compute the mean of the annual deviations from the benchmark of the years 2010-2012 (TE_AllocationBenchmark).
A positive average "tracking error" should indicate an added value by the pension fund manager.
(I)
An additional, yet similar performance measure that we employ is a pension fund's deviation to its policy benchmark. Individual policy benchmark data for each fund was collected with our proprietary questionnaire 3 • The tracking error is computed as the mean difference between a pension fund's net return (Rpp) and the return of its individual policy benchmark index (R 1 B) in the evaluation period (TE_PolicyBenchmark).
(2) Lastly, to capture pension fund performance on a risk-adjusted basis, we compute the pension funds' Sharpe ratios (Sharpe). Sharpe ratios are computed as the difference of the pension plans' geometric mean return of the years 2010-2012 (p,,) and the risk-free rate as proxied by the geometric annual average yield of 10-year Swiss confederation bonds (Rh) divided by the pension funds' annual volatility (o-,) for the 10-year period. To eliminate distortionary effects of large outliers, pension portfolios with Sharpe ratios in excess of 1 are excluded from the analysis (3 funds excluded).
(3)
3 Some few pension funds did report that they do not measure their performance against a benchmark. In those few cases, we used the passive benchmark instead.
Methodology
In the following sections, we examine the relationship between governance and investment performance of Swiss occupational pension funds. To do this, we regress the different performance measures on our composite G-SCORE and its constituent sub-scores. Those metrics are estimated with the following model:
+{3 8 AMCosts + {3 9 AdminCosts + c whereby PF_PM is a vector of the different performance measures (as explained in section 3) and SCORE is a variable consisting of either our composite governance score (j= 1) or one of its constituent sub-scores (}=2, .. . ,6). Since we expect that pension fund size affects performance, we include the natural logarithm of the average pension assets of the period 2010-2012 into the equation (Ln(Size)). To disentangle differences between public and private pension funds, we furthermore include the variable Public, which is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 for public pension funds and zero otherwise. Further control dummies are DBPlan and ClosedFund, which take on the value 1 for a defined benefit plan and a closed pension fund, respectively. Since we also want to investigate the relationship between the risk coverage on a pension fund's passive side and performance, we include the dummy variable Autonomous, which assumes the value 1 for autonomous pension funds and zero for all partly autonomous or fully insured funds. We furthermore expect that pension plans with more pensioners relative to active members have a different risk and return attitude that might affect asset allocation and hence indirectly performance. Therefore, we include the variable RatioAP into the equation, where RatioAP expresses the ratio of active participants to pensioners as averaged over the years 2010-2012. In their study, AMMANN and ZINGG (2010) find that asset management costs are negatively related to pension funds' investment performance as measured by their net value added variable. Since we expect that both administration and asset management costs reduce plan performance at the detriment of beneficiaries, we finally include the explanatory variables Admin Costs and AMCosts into the regression.
Both variables are measured as average costs in basis points of total assets over the 3-year investigation period. Appendix 3 shows a summary of the variables including their explanations.
It should be noted at this point that our G-SCORE metric might potentially suffer from endogeneity-a well-known issue for governance variables or indices. For instance, it might be the case that well performing pension funds attract skilled managers to run the fund which, in turn, also has an effect on the governance structures. We cannot generally rule out such scenarios which might have an impact on the interpretations of our empirical results. It should furthermore be noted that our results allow no inferences about any causal relationship between governance and performance 4
• While it might be (more) likely that good pension fund governance drives superior investment performance, the causality might also run reversely in the sense that funds with good performance can, for whatever reasons, install better governance structures.
Finally, it should be noted that since all performance metrics are computed with realised 3-year data, our results might be somewhat "backward-predicting", however, as some governance variables might have changed over the 3-year period 5
• The lack of publicly available data for Swiss pension funds as well as the trade-off between the scope of the survey and the response rate made it impossible to analyse a data panel. However, most of our governance variables are rather "sticky" in nature and unlikely to be altered on a frequent basis.
Motivated by the empirical findings of HARPER (2008), who finds that board composition of U.S. public pension funds is related to asset allocation decisions and thus indirectly to performance, we additionally examine the relationship between our governance variables and the effective asset allocation weights of the pension funds in our sample. Asset allocation data was obtained from each pension fund as of the end of2012. To investigate this relationship, we make use of the following multivariate model:
whereby AC, is a vector of the different asset class weights, G-SCORE is our composite governance score and the remaining explanatory variables are the same as AMMANN I EHMANN employed in the performance analysis above 6 • Regressions are run stepwise on each weight in order to determine which factors are related to asset allocation decisions. Since the dependent variables (i.e., the allocation weights) are truncated, we employ a Tobit regression in which we specify the left-censoring limit to 0% and the right-sensoring limit to 100%.
To account for the problem of multicollinearity, we compute correlations between the explanatory variables in both the performance and the asset allocation analysis. This statistical examination shows that governance is highly correlated to pension fund size. This has already been documented by AMMANN and ZINGG (2010) , yet to a lesser extent. To avoid distortionary effects stemming from multicollinearity, the variable Ln(Size) was orthogonalised before applied in the regression equation.
Pension Fund Governance in Switzerland

Summary Statistics of the Sample
The occupational pension system in Switzerland comprises a total number of 2,073 pension funds by the end of 2012 (Swiss FEDERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, 2014). Occupational insurance is mandatory. Every employee older than 17 years who receives an annual salary in excess of21,060 CHF is compulsorily required to join a registered pension scheme pursuant to the Federal Law on Occupational Old-age, Survivors' and Disability Pension Plans. Due to the limited availability of public data, we conduct a mail survey among 1,600 entities in order to evaluate their governance structures quantitatively. Of those, 139 returned completed questionnaires. This equals a response rate of around 9%. Pension fund executives were asked about the governance criteria as described in detail in section 2 (and the appendix) of this paper and their realised investment performance net of costs for the years 2003-2012. The questionnaire furthermore contained questions about the institutional structure of the pension plan, its financial situation and risk coverage, its effective asset allocation as of the end of 2012 (including its benchmark performance), and its administration and asset management costs for the years 2010-2012. Table 7 provides the summary statistics of our sample as well as comparative statistics to the Swiss pension fund universe. Sample and universe data is reported as of the end of 2012. Notes: Number of pension plans, plan types, plan models, and risk coverage structures of our data sample compared to the entire Swiss pension fund universe. Sample and universe data is reported as of the end of2012.
* pension funds with excess ofloss-or stop-loss insurance are also considered autonomous Table 7 shows that our sample is neither representative in terms of the structure nor in terms of the number of pension funds in Switzerland. It only covers around 7o/o of all registered Swiss occupational pension schemes as of the end of 2012. However, we consider our sample representative as far as total plan assets are concerned. It covers almost half of Switzerland's pension universe assets in all three years under scrutiny, as shown Table 8 . Table 8 furthermore shows that the sample is strongly heterogeneous in terms of the pension fund sizes. For the year 2012, the plan assets range from CHF 5.2 million (smallest fund) to CHF 34.9 billion (largest fund). The average plan assets per pension fund in 2012 amount to approximately CHF 2,061 million with a standard deviation of CHF 4,644 million. Hence, the sample average significantly exceeds the average pension fund size of CHF 324.6 million across all occupational pension schemes in Switzerland in 2012, implying that our sample is biased towards larger pension funds. The sample median for 2012 amounts to CHF 315 million. The sample is thus strongly influenced by a small number of very large pension funds. This is not surprising: More than 22o/o of pension funds that are included in our sample are set up under public law. Those funds are organised on either the cantonal or the Notes: Plan assets, coverage ratios, technical interest rates, and the ratio of active plan members to retirees of our sample funds for the years 2010-2012. The data is based on the 139 retUrned questionnaires. * without assets from insurance contracts; in million CHF ** 2 pension funds did not report technical interest rates for the years 2010-2012 federal level. Since they insure a large number of public sector employees, they are naturally very large in terms of assets under management. By the end of2012, Switzerland administered 91 public pension funds which held almost 30o/o of total universe plan assets (Swrss FEDERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, 2014). Of those, 31 are included in our sample. Hence, as compared to the Swiss pension fund universe, public pension funds are overrepresented in our data. Our questionnaire also included questions about the risk coverage on the pension entities' liability side. As shown in Table 7 , more than 71o/o of sample funds bear old-age, death, and disability risks themselves. This is a typical characteristic for larger pension funds. As compared to the entire pension fund universe, autonomous pension plans are thus also overrepresented in the sample, whereas partly autonomous plans are underrepresented. Funds that fully insure their liability risks (including investment risks) account for only a very small sample fraction. Table 8 additionally sample had funding ratios below 100%. This implies that our sample is biased towards rather fully funded pension funds. Since the risk-bearing capacity of a pension plan is partly related to its funding level, the sample is therefore likely to include funds that are more inclined to invest in riskier assets. It is furthermore noteworthy that our sample includes a relatively large fraction of pensioners. The average ratio of active participants to pensioners for the years 2010-2012 amounts to around 3, whereas the same average amounts to approximately 5.1 for the Swiss universe (SwiSS FEDERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, 2014). In 2012, the plans in our sample include almost half of Switzerland's' recipients of occupational old-age and disability benefits. This might possibly have implications for the funds' aggregated asset allocation.
Since we aim to investigate the pension schemes' performance net of costs, we also asked pension fund executives about their internal costs structures. Table 9 depicts a detailed breakdown of the general administration costs, direct asset management costs, and indirect asset management costs of transparent collective investment vehicles for our sample funds for the years 2010-2012 7 • 7 Direct asset management costs are defined as expenses that are included in a pension fund's profit and loss account (e.g., costs for external asset management mandates) whereas indirect asset management costs are defined as expenses that are not directly included in a pension fund's income statement but related to collective investment vehicles (e.g., such as annual fund management fees, loads for mutual funds, etc.).
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Results of the Survey
To examine the current governance state of our sample pension funds, we create the Swiss Pension Fund Governance Score (G-SCORE). The G-SCORE metric is based on the responses of the 139 Swiss occupational pension funds that have completed our standardised questionnaire. The basis for the questionnaire are the assessment criteria as described in section 2 of this paper. Table 10 summarises the results of the 6 sub-scores and the overall composite score for the sample. It can assume values between 0 and 60 whereby a high score implies a sound and comprehensive internal governance structure. The maximum achievable points for each category are reported in parentheses. Table 11 depicts the summary statistics of the performance measures as computed in section 3. On average, pension plans obtained 32.4 points on the composite score. The mean as a percentage of the score maximum lies slightly above 50o/o. Composite G-SCORE points range from 10.5 (lowest) to 49.5 (highest). Half of the pension funds obtained scores in excess of33.6. No pension fund in our sample achieved the maximum score that can be possibly reached (60 points).
Governance structures were found to be relatively comprehensive in the areas of target setting and investment strategy definition, investment processes and risk management. In the areas of management objective design, monitoring effectiveness and transparency there is still room for improvement, however. Although clear management objectives are an essential component of good governance, only about 34o/o of pension funds in our sample reported to have an own written statement regarding their strategic goals (i.e., mission statement). Even more notably, only 22o/o reported to have defined management objectives for the board of trustees, whereas more than 72o/o of entities had defined management objectives for the CEO or senior pension fund executive(s). In opposition to the recommendations of AMBACHTSHEER, CAPELLE, and ScHEIBELHUT (1998), compensation policies for both executive and supervisory committee members of Swiss occupational pension plans are not reasonably linked to performance. Only 3 pension funds reported that their CEOs' financial compensation is linked to individual objectives or the funds' investment performance. Almost two thirds of CEOs or senior executives receive fixed financial compensation without a variable component. For trustee boards, performance-linked compensation is effectively not existing in Switzerland. No single pension fund in our sample compensates its trustee board members based on the achievement of individual objectives or plan performance. The majority of trustees are solely reimbursed for their expenses or obtain a flat-fee expense allowance. About 14o/o of trustees do not receive financial compensation at all. 3Il * MPSM =Mean as percentage of score maximum Our survey furthermore reveals that risk management is an important issue on the agenda of Swiss pension plan managers. Only about 12o/o of funds in our sample reported to undertake no active risk management. Regular assessment of risk-bearing capacity is conducted by more than 90o/o of the plans. However, although most pension funds do make use of risk management practices, specific risk factors such as portfolio tail risks receive less attention. Only 16o/o of funds reported to have a strategic emergency plan for disaster risks in place. While a number of European financial regulators require mandatory stress tests for occupational pension arrangements, only about one third of pension funds in our sample include internal stress tests in their risk management frameworks. 312 AMMANN I EHMANN Particularly larger pension funds with plan assets in excess of CHF 1 billion do not systematically conduct such analyses 8 • We moreover find evidence for a lack of professional expertise among the governing bodies. More than 70% of funds in our sample reported to have trustee hoard members that are not elected because of their specialised knowledge regarding pension issues. Task-specific education programs for trustees are neither pervasive. Around 39% of sample funds have not established any education or training concept for trustees or executives. This is an alarming result given the extensive fiduciary responsibility that hoard members have to the pension plans' beneficiaries. Although recommended in the literature, mandatory retirement provisions for board members and board term limits are not common in Switzerland. Only 24o/o of pension funds in our sample make use of maximum age thresholds while around 18% have established term limits.
Some minor issues were also identified in the area of monitoring and transparency. For instance, in contrast to corporate hoards in Switzerland, trustee hoards are not legally required to disclose their members' additional mandates in the plans' annual report. Our survey reveals that only very few (8.6o/o) pension entities in our sample disclose those mandates on a voluntary basis. Transparency is moreover lacking in terms of informing plan stakeholders about internal policies to exercise shareholder voting rights. Although new legal regulations require the mandatory exercise of voting rights attached to portfolio stocks, less than one third of funds in the sample have established an explicit information concept for their active members and pensioners.
Overall, we do not find any systematic governance weaknesses in the Swiss occupational pension fund system. It is possible, however, that this may he driven by a self-selection bias in the sense that pension funds with inferior governance structures may not have responded to our questionnaire request. Since our sample is moreover biased towards larger funds, we might potentially overestimate the governance quality of the entire Swiss pension plan universe. Those limitations might also have implications for the interpretations of the empirical results as described below.
Is Governance Related to Investment Performance and Asset Allocation? Table 12 shows the results of the initial analysis of the sample funds' governance categories. We split our sample into G-SCORE quartiles and sort them from highest (I) to lowest (4). Table 12 shows that the arithmetic average of each respective performance metric within each goverance quartile decreases monotonically for all of the analysed metrics. For both variables ExcessReturn and TE_ AllocationBenchmark, the average within the highest governance quartile exceeds the average within the lowest quartile by approximatdy 1 o/o. Pension funds within the highest G-SCORE quartile furthermore underperform, on average, their individual policy benchmarks (i.e., TE_PolicyBenchmark) by around 75 basis points less than their lowest quartile counterparts. The Sharpe ratio difference between quartile 1 and 4 is also positive, as shown in the table. TE_AllocationBenchmark is the average deviation from the passive benchmark strategy for the years 2010-2012. TE_PolicyBenchmark is the average deviation from the pension funds own policy benchmark for the years 2010-2012. Sharpe is the pension funds' Sharpe ratio, as defined in section 3 of this paper. *** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance.
Empirical Findings
In order to control for other factors that might be rdated to superior net investment performance, we conduct the multivariate regressions, as defined in section 4. Table 13 shows the empirical results of the relationship between governance and the sample funds' excess performance during the evaluation period. Our analysis reveals that governance is positivdy rdated to average excess returns. Governance structure, as measured by our composite G-SCORE, affects mean excess returns by around 3 basis points. Put differently, a one-standard deviation increase in the composite score (cr=8.9) is associated with an increase in excess performance of roughly 25 basis points. The economic magnitude of our results are therefore clearly significant. Particularly target setting and investment strategy definition as well as risk management design is strongly positively related to the average investment performance in excess of the risk-free rate. This is not surprising, as the TSIS Score includes essential governance factors that are directly related to a pension fund's portfolio strategy. The analysis of the individual TSIS Score components shows that particularly independent external experts that participate in investment strategy meetings have a substantial positive relation to performance. Pension plans in our sample that draw on such outside advisers have a higher mean excess return by approximately 51 basis points.
We furthermore find evidence that pension fund size is strongly positively related to average excess performance. Our analysis shows that larger pension funds have been able to achieve, on average, higher excess returns than smaller funds during the evaluation period. This result can be explained by the fact that larger pension schemes are likely to have more institutionalised internal governance processes in place. This has also been documented by YERMO and STEWART (2008) , who claim that small funds are less likely to achieve comparable levels of performance than large funds, even gross of fees, due to weaker governance structures and inconsistent internal processes. It might also explain why governance is strongly correlated to plan size in our sample. By contrast, legal form, pension fund type, pension fund model, risk coverage, and administration and asset management costs do not affect the mean excess performance measurably. Surprisingly, autonomous pension funds, which are usually large in size, do not have a significantly higher average investment performance. Neither do we find any statistically robust evidence for an effect of direct asset management costs, which should theoretically reduce the net performance.
The relationship between governance and the value added by a pension fund's asset manager is shown in Table 14 and Table 15 . Our results also point to a positive relationship between governance structure and the 3-year arithmetic mean difference between net fund return and the return of the passive benchmark strategy. The effect has a magnitude of approximately 2.8 basis points per G-SCORE point. This result is again primarily driven by the constituent subscores TSIS and RIMA.
In addition to governance, our data shows that the ratio of active plan members to plan pensioners is positively related to outperformance as measured by the variable TE_AllocationBenchmark. Pension funds with more active members underperform the passive benchmark to a lesser extent. This might be explained by the different risk attitude and asset allocation of pension funds that have more active members relative to pensioners. Moreover, we find that larger pension funds do not only have higher average excess performance, but also underperform the passive investment strategy to a lesser extent. In order to test the results of the TE_AllocationBenchmark variable for robustness, we furthermore measure outperformance with the mean deviation of a plan's investment performance to its own policy benchmark as reported in our questionnaire. Using this performance metric, we find similar results. As shown in Table 15 , target setting and investment strategy definition is primarily related to mean outperformance of a fund's policy benchmark. The effect for the TSIS Score is as large as around 21.5 basis points. Interestingly, in the analysis of the individual TSIS Score components on TE_PolicyBenchmark, the size factor disappears entirely for this variable. The positive mean deviation from the individual policy benchmark can thus not be explained by the average pension assets under management. This might be due to the fact that the funds' customised policy benchmarks are often chosen inconsistently with their effective asset allocations. The relatively low adjusted R 2 s for this particular model and the large negative constant term additionally point to this. In contrast to our expectations, organisational setup and investment process design is neither related to mean excess returns nor to benchmark outperformance. We find no empirical evidence that board governance factors such as separation of executive and supervisory functions, trustee board size, or the existence of an education concept are related to superior investment performance. Even if we alter the above-defined size thresholds for the board of trustees or the investment committees, we find no statistically significant results. Neither do we find any effect for investment process factors such as asset manager selection procedures or the existence of a chief investment officer. Those factors do not explain excess returns or positive benchmark deviations for the funds in our sample. This result is somewhat counterintuitive, as particularly the components of the INVP Score are directly associated with a pension fund's asset management processes. To validate these findings, we conduct an examination of the individual INVP Score components for those funds that reported to have external asset managers on board 9
• The analysis validates our initial results. We do not find any empirical evidence that external asset manager selection procedures are related to superior performance. While structured procedures are nonetheless desirable in order to avoid conflicts of interests, their relationship to performance is not statistically measurable. We furthermore find no conclusive evidence for a relationship between the degree of transparency, as measured by our MOTR Score, and excess returns or average benchmark outperformance. While transparency is an important governance variable that aims to protect the interests of plan members, "soft" factors such as the disclosure of board members' additional mandates or peer group benchmarking practices have no direct effect on plan performance. Although neither directly associated with the investment process, we do find some evidence that the design of management objectives is related to both mean excess returns and outperformance as measured by the variable TE_AllocationBenchmark. The statistical significance of those results is weak, however. The analysis of the individual score constituents of the MANO Score reveals that particularly the existence of an own mission statement drives the results. Pension funds in our sample that have an own written statement regarding their overall strategic goals have a higher average excess return by approximately 41 basis points and have positively deviated from the passive benchmark by around 44 basis points on average during the evaluation period. Board and senior management compensation policies, by contrast, do not have any measurable effect.
To account for different portfolio risk structures, we finally regress Sharpe ratios on our model. The results in Table 16 show that governance is also positively related to the risk-adjusted excess returns. The significant positive coefficient estimates for both the TSIS Score and the RIMA Score clearly underpin this. Hence, regardless of which performance measure employed, we find that superior investment performance, both on a non-risk adjusted and risk-adjusted basis, seems to be particularly related to a pension fund's target setting and investment strategy definition process and, yet to lesser extent, its risk management design. Organisational structure, investment processes, and transparency are found to be less important for performance.
Lastly, in opposite to the findings of ANDONOV, BAUER, and CREMERS (2011), we find that tactical asset allocation is detrimental for the funds in our sample. The coefficient estimate for this TSIS Score constituent is significantly negative for the variables ExcessReturn and TE_AllocationBenchmark, indicating that short-term fluctuations from the policy structure rather destroy than add value for plan beneficiaries. This implies that the sample plan managers were not able to achieve persistent gains from market timing or security selection practices during the evaluation period. Due to the relatively large coefficient standard errors, the statistical validity of this result is somewhat limited, however. For the variable Sharpe, no statistically significant effect is found. 320 AMMANN I EHMANN To relate pension fund governance to asset allocation decisions, we run Tobit regressions of the pension funds' effective asset class weights as of the end of2012 on the G-SCORE and control variables. Table 17 shows the summary statistics of the realised asset allocation weights. Table 18 shows the results of this examination. While we find some evidence that governance is negatively related to the proportion of domestic equity investments, our analysis reveals that asset allocation decisions are not primarily associated with governance structure, but rather with size, legal form, and a pension fund's ratio of active members to retirees. As shown in Table 18 , the Swiss pension funds in our sample invest on average around 0.17o/o less in equities denominated in Swiss franc for each G-SCORE point. This might be explained by the fact that plans with high G-SCOREs do have more comprehensive risk management systems in place that allow them to invest a larger proportion of their funds in foreign assets which entail additional risk factors 10 • In fact, the analysis of the individual constituent sub-scores reveals that primarily RIMA and ORGA drive those results. Apart from governance, particularly size seems to be an important factor affecting asset allocation. Our analysis shows that larger funds invest a substantially larger proportion of their assets in foreign equities (+4.32o/o) and alternative investments (+3.61%). Since some alternative asset classes such as specialised hedge funds or closed-end private equity funds often require a high minimum investment amount, this finding has economic justification. Diversification considerations let smaller funds refrain from such investments. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that larger pension funds allocate a larger fraction of their investable funds to equities and invest less in real estate (domestic and foreign) and liquid cash holdings. This finding indicates that they generally opt for riskier asset classes which might additionally explain their higher mean excess returns in the evaluation period. Some part of their superior excess performance hence might come at the cost of higher risk and asset volatility. Since larger pension schemes have more institutionalised risk management structures that allow them to control riskier investments, such asset allocation decisions are evident from an economic point of view.
In addition to plan size, we find that both a pension fund's legal form and its relation of active members to pensioners are related to its asset allocation decisions. Our empirical results show that pension arrangements that are set up under public law invest around 6.6o/o more in domestic real estate and hold a significantly larger part of employer investments (primarily in the form of federal government, cantonal, or municipal bonds). The regression estimates furthermore 10 E.g., such as currency risks, political risks, etc. indicate that public pension funds grant more mortgages than private pension funds and allocate less capital to foreign equities and domestic bonds. This might be an indication for a home bias tendency. Our findings show that staterun pension schemes tend to exhibit a rather domestic investment focus regarding real estate and equity investments. Although our results point to a negative relationship between public funds and domestic bond allocations, there is some evidence that state-run plans substitute domestic bonds with government or municipal bonds that are to be classified as investments with the employer under their investment statutes. 
Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between governance structures, investment performance, and asset allocation decisions of occupational pension plans in Switzerland. Based on survey responses from 139 entities, we find empirical evidence that pension fund governance is positively related to investment performance, but only marginally to the funds' asset class choices. This has important implications for the industry in that it shows that the establishment of comprehensive governance structures might directly benefit plan members. While our study does not give any indication of the direction of causality, however, it shows that good governance pertaining to target setting, investment strategy definition, and risk management design is positively related to both excess-and riskadjusted net fund returns. For our analysis, we draw on four different portfolio performance measures: 1) average excess return, 2) passive benchmark outperformance, 3) individual benchmark outperformance, and 4) Sharpe ratio. Regardless of which particular measure we employ, we find both statistically and economically significant positive effects for the composite G-SCORE metric, as well as for the sub-scores that cover target setting and investment strategy and risk management. The investigation of those individual sub-score components furthermore shows that particularly independent external experts that participate in investment strategy meetings are associated with superior performance. Risk management design is also found to be an important factor that is related to net investment performance. While we find a positive relationship between comprehensive risk management practices and excess returns and passive benchmark deviations, we do not find statistically significant effects when analysing Sharpe ratios. The analysis of the individual score components for the management objectives score (MANO Score) furthermore reveals that a clear specification of organisational goals and strategic targets by means of a written mission statement is positively related to passive benchmark outperformance. For investment allocation decisions, we find that governance structures are only of little importance. The 2012 year-end asset allocation weights of our sample pension portfolios are primarily related to institutional factors such as size, legal form, and the ratio of active plan members to pensioners. We do not find conclusive empirical evidence that governance is related to those realised allocation weights. 
Appendix
Construction of the G-SCORE: Details on the Components
AI) Organisation Score (ORGA)
The OECD Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance recommend dear identification and assignment of responsibilities. Since dear lines of authority are an essential component of good pension fund governance, we argue that Swiss pension funds should have organisational regulations that explicitly allocate the most important areas of responsibilities to the their governing bodies (1) 11 • Clear separation of power between those bodies might furthermore contribute to transparency in decision-making and reduce the risks of fraud and management misconduct. Therefore, we punish pension funds whose board members hold both executive and supervisory functions (1). To ensure a high degree of objectivity and independence in decision-making and monitoring, the supervisory body might consider establishing specialised board committees that are assigned with specific tasks. WRIGHT et al. (2013) describe that sub-committees are effective in bringing greater specialisation and objectivity by board members as well as greater attention to discrete issues. The Organisation Score therefore rewards pension funds whose board structure includes sub-committees (1).
To effectively steer their business operations, many occupational pension schemes in Switzerland employ a full-time CEO who is solely in charge of pension fund issues. However, smaller pension funds often assign the administration responsibility to one (or several) employee(s) of the sponsor firm, who dedicate part of their working time to pension fund matters since employing a full-time CEO would be disproportionately costly. The decision of whether a full-time CEO is economically sensible or not thus needs to be made in light of a pension fund's size. The Organisation Score hence rewards smaller funds and punishes larger funds for not having a CEO who dedicates 100% of his employment time to pension issues (1) 12 • In addition to the executive officers, the board of trustees plays a key role in occupational pension fund governance. Its main functions are the definition and implementation of the pension plan's investment strategy, the advisory of the CEO, and the ongoing monitoring of activities in the best interest of the scheme's stakeholders. Corporate governance literature on board structure points to a negative relationship between board size and firm performance. It is argued that large boards are less effective than small boards due to coordination and agency problems 13
• For U.S. pension funds, lMPAVIDO (2002) claims that the number of trustees should be limited, as this reduces individual free-riding incentives and thus maximises board effectiveness. HARPER (2008) finds a negative statistical relationship between trustee board size and funding levels of U.S. public pension plans. We apply this literature to occupational pension schemes in Switzerland. In line with those findings, we hypothesize that trustee board size is negatively related to the investment performance of Swiss pension funds 14 • However, while we also acknowledge that large boards might be more difficult to manage and are thus less effective, we challenge the notion that there is an absolute number of trustees that is optimal (as suggested by CLARK and URWIN, 2008) irrespective of the size of the fund. Since we expect that larger pension funds will naturally have larger trustee boards, we decline a "one-size-fits-all" approach and put board size in relation to pension fund size. The Organisation Score therefore rewards pension funds with plan assets of less than 100 million CHF: for having not more than 6 trustee board members; with plan assets in excess of 100 million CHF, but less than 1,000 million CHF: for having not more than 8 trustee board members; and with plan assets in excess of 1,000 million CHF: for having not more than 12 trustee board members. The above-stated size thresholds are based on the sample means of the respective pension fund size category. Disproportionate deviations from the average number of trustees can thus be detected in a relatively simple manner 15 • We follow the same logic for the size of the investment committee. Since the investment committee is also an important governance body, its dimension should be in appropriate relation to a pension plan's assets. Hence, the Organisation Score rewards pension funds with plan assets of less than 100 million CHF: for not having more than 3 investment committee members; with plan assets in excess of 100 million CHF, but less than 1,000 million CHF: for having not more than 4 investment committee members and; with plan assets in excess of 1,000 million CHF: for having not more than 6 investment committee members 16 • 13 See, for example, LIPTON and LoRSCH (1992) or jENSEN (1993) . 14 It should be noted that there is no regulatory minimum or maximum number of trustee board members for pension funds in Switzerland. 15 To test for robustness, those thresholds are varied in the empirical analysis (e.g., changed to the sample median of each size category, the mean or median of the entire data sample, or to the fixed numbers as recommended by CLARK and URWIN, 2008) . The results of these variations are discussed in section 6. 16 If a pension fund stated to have no investment committee, no points were assigned. The size thresholds were also based on the sample mean and tested for robustness in the empirical section.
Since the board of trustees is the key element in the management framework of Swiss pension schemes, its human capital is of critical importance for the funds) governance quality. We therefore additionally reward pension funds that have an appropriate board composition pertaining to 1) age structure and 2) trustee expertise. Age structure of boards has been a central point of interest in the corporate governance literature. KANAGARETNAM, Loaot and WHALEN (2007) state that boards with older members are considered to be less efficient) as those members do not actively participate in board activities anymore. BROWN and CAYLOR (2006) provide empirical evidence. For U.S. public pension funds) HARPER (2008) finds that longer board terms lead to lower net returns. Since an overaged trustee board might potentially suffer from inner inertia and lower monitoring effectiveness, our Organisation Score assigns 1 point to pension funds that have specified a mandatory retirement age provision (I). Good governance furthermore requires that all board members possess adequate qualification, knowledge, and expertise to steer and monitor the pension funds' strategic and operational activities. In the aftermath of the financial crisis this requirement has particularly gained in importance. Increasing complexity concerning pension issues and changing conditions on the global capital markets more than ever require highly qualified trustees. However, since Article 51 of the Swiss Federal Law on Occupational Old-age, Survivors' and Disability Pension Plans (BVG) calls for paritarian representation of employers and employees on the board of trustees, there is an inherent trade-off between representation and expertise within Swiss occupational pension funds. This has also been documented by CLARK (2007) for UK pension funds and U.S. mutual funds. While this is an institutional problem, it is furthermore difficult to determine an "optimart qualification level for trustees or executives. Since an entirely objective measure for adequate qualification and expertise is difficult to define, we follow the recommendation of CLARK (2004) , who proposes that pension fund trustees should optimally possess relevant professional qualifications and obtain ongoing task-specific training. In line with this recommendation) the Organisation Score rewards pension funds whose board members are solely elected on the basis of their specialised knowledge regarding pension issues (1) 17
• Furthermore, we argue that it might be beneficial for pension funds to have a task-specific educational training concept for their trustees regarding I) legal provisions and regulatory requirements, 2) the investment strategy(-ies) of the pension fund and) 3) the risk management practices of the pension fund. Since we believe that 331 all those topics are essential, we reward pension funds that have an education programme containing all three elements (1). In order to fill the gap of a lack of internal expertise, pension funds' governing bodies should furthermore draw on independent external specialists or consultants that are specialised in pension matters, actuarial issues, and investment management. The OECD Guidelines on Pemion Fund Governance support this view by stipulating that the appointment of independent professionals to the governing body is an effective way to promote good governance (1).
A2) Management Objectives Score (MANO)
The definition of management objectives and the design of supportive incentive structures are focal points of governance systems. While literature on those aspects primarily focuses on corporate boards, we believe that corporate governance principles are also applicable for pension funds' trustee boards. YERMO and STEWART (2008) point to the problem that boards of trustees often lack a clear mission statement and engage in operational duties which should be left to internal management staff or external service providers. Since a clear specification of organisational goals helps the board to concentrate on its primary tasks, we postulate that an occupational pension fund should have an own written statement regarding its overall strategic targets (1). To reconcile strategic targets with management tasks, clear objectives should be defined for the board of trustees (1). Good pension fund governance might furthermore require incentive structures that link board member compensation to performance. Ambachtsheer, CAPELLE, and ScHEIBELHUT (1998) persuasively argue that organisational goals should be clear and compensation policies should be related to the achievement of those goals in order to align the economic interests of plan members with the interests of management. CLARK and URWIN (2010) furthermore assert that competitive compensation structures aligned with effective performance measurement will enhance the professional competence of trustee boards. While this argumentation is persuasive in theory, the above-stated recommendations are only scarcely implemented by Swiss pension funds in reality. To investigate whether competitive incentive structures for board members are effectively related to performance and asset allocation, we hypothesise that they have a positive effect and therefore reward pension funds whose board members receive performance-linked financial compensation (1) 18
• Since competitive incentive structures should not only 332 AMMANN I EHMANN be established for the board of trustees, but also for operational executives, we furthermore argue that well-governed pension funds should define individual management objectives for their CEOs (I) and regularly measure the CEO's performance against those pre-defined objectives (1) 19 • To align CEO interests with the interests of plan members, the MANO Score also assigns 1 point to pension plans whose CEO compensation is linked to the CEO's individual management objectives and/or investment performance. Lastly, in order to be able to effectively deal with conflicts of interest and other governance-related internal issues, a pension fund should have implemented an own written code of conduct to which all bodies involved in the management and oversight process of the pension plan must abide to (1). Existing governance charras (e.g., such as the ASIP-charta or the OECD guidelines) might thereby be useful as a reference point.
A3) Target Setting and Investment Strategy Score (TSIS)
A structured investment planning process and a clear target of financing are fundamental prerequisites for superior pension fund performance. The minimum required yield is the return a pension fund needs to achieve on a long-term basis in order to keep its financial balance. AMMANN and ZINGG (2010) describe that the minimum required return net of asset management costs should at least consider guaranteed interest on pension liabilities, longevity risk, accumulation of value fluctuation reserves, and administration costs (1). Since all those parameters can change over time, it might be reasonable to review this minimum yield regularly, at least on an annual basis (1) 20 • To guarantee an optimal portfolio construction process, a pension fund should have realistic expectations about the return and the volatility of its strategic asset allocation (2) 21 • Furthermore, since both the expected return of the strategic asset allocation and the minimum required yield can change over time, the two performance figures should be reviewed against each other on a regular basis (1). To achieve a long-term balance between assets and liabilities, the pension fund's expected policy return 22 must exceed (or at least be equal to)
19 If a pension fund reported to have no CEO, the maximum achievable points in this sub-score was set to 4. 20 The Investment Strategy and Target Setting Score assigns 0.5 points if the minimum required yield is reviewed at least biannually and 0 points for no regular reviews. 21 The estimates were deemed realistic if I) the historical mean return of the investment strategy was greater than or equal to the reported expected return and 2) if the historical volatility was lower than or equal to the reported expected volatility of the strategic asset allocation. A 10% tolerance level was applied.
the minimum required yield (1). Policy return and asset allocation decisions are frequently taken by the board of trustees in investment strategy meetings. Since such decisions have a substantial impact on the long-term performance of a pension fund, we claim that they should be accompanied by external investment management specialists. Therefore, we reward pension funds that employ independent external experts that participate in investment strategy meetings (1). While a pension fund's strategic asset allocation determines the long-term asset class weights, short-term deviations from the policy structure may theoretically enhance portfolio performance. Empirical evidence on the benefits of tactical asset allocation is contradictory, however. ANDONOV et al. (2011) find evidence that U.S. defined benefit plans were able to obtain superior performance from intentional changes in their strategic asset allocation and market timing decisions. Other scholars, such as BLAKE, LEHMANN, and TIMMERMANN (1999) or BLAKE et al. (2013) find counterevidence for British pension schemes. To investigate whether short-term deviations from the strategic allocation are beneficial or detrimental for Swiss pension fund portfolios, the TSIS Score assigns 1 point to funds that pursue active tactical asset allocation (1). Simultaneously, in order to ensure that short-term deviations of asset class weights from the strategic policy do not materially change the longterm investment strategy, we argue that pension fund managers should regularly compare their effective (i.e., realised) portfolio allocation to their strategic asset allocation (1). Potential rebalancing needs can thus be detected in timely manner. Furthermore, in order to be able to respond adequately to structural changes in capital market conditions, a pension fund's management should regularly review its long-term investment strategy, at least on an annual basis.
A4) Investment Process Score (INVP)
The implementation of the determined investment strategy requires a structured investment process. To follow a systematic portfolio management process, most pension funds have established investment regulations including objectives and general principles, investment guidelines, controlling, accounting, and reporting procedures as well as loyalty regulations in asset management. Since both regulatory and strategic changes may require the revision of established regulations, our Investment Process Score rewards pension funds that review their investment regulations at least on an annual basis (1? 334 AMMANN I EHMANN reduce idiosyncratic risks. A fundamental pillar in the Swiss occupational pension system is the separation between plan assets and assets of the plan sponsor. Article 57 of the Ordinance on Occupational Old-age, Survivors' and Disability Pension Plans (BVV2) stipulates that non-collateralised investments with the employer must not exceed 5 per cent of plan assets, whereas a number of exceptions apply for collateralised investments. In order to reduce exposure to idiosyncratic employer risks, we reward pension funds that do generally not allocate more than 5 per cent of their assets to employer investments, be it in the form of debt or equity (1). Decisions about investment style have a substantial impact on a pension fund's performance net of costs. The principles of prudence, diligence, and reasonable care therefore require a detailed investment analysis for each asset class (1). This analysis particularly includes decisions about active versus passive investment approaches, direct versus indirect investing decisions, and the appointment of external investment managers. Such decisions might be efficiently implemented by a chief investment officer with dear responsibilities and execution powers (1).
Occasional events of misconduct and cronyism in assigning mandates to external asset managers by Swiss pension funds have demonstrated the need for objectivity and transparency in the asset manager selection process. To ensure a meritbased assignment of mandates, pension funds should establish explicit selection and dismissal criteria that are objectively quantifiable (1). Investment consultants that assist the manager search can potentially streamline the process by reaping economies in evaluating information (1? 4 • To guarantee unbiased trustee decision-making, we also argue that external asset managers should not participate in investment strategy meetings (1).
In order to avoid conflicts of interest, it has become common practice for institutional investors to assign external asset management mandates based on competitive tendering procedures. While a competitive tendering procedure is not required for occupational pension funds under Swiss law, competition amongst bidding investment managers is likely to benefit pension plan members (1) 25 • Since manager fees reduce the net investment performance at the detriment of beneficiaries, we furthermore argue that well-governed pension funds should regularly re-negotiate, or at least revise, the direct costs of external asset management mandates, at best on an annual basis (1) 26
• Additionally, to avoid significant 24 GoYAL and WAHAL (2008) find that investment consultants add value for U.S. small sponsor plans in the form of higher post-hiring manager returns. 25 E.g., in the form oflower costs or better services. 26 For biannual re-negotiations or revisions, we assign 0.5 score points.
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mismatches between assets and liabilities, we hypothesise that it might be beneficial for pension funds to conduct an ongoing asset-liability management, so as to ensure the plan's long-term financial health (1).
A5) Risk Management Score (RIMA)
Risk management is at the heart of each investment process. The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of this discipline particularly. The OECD Guidelines on Pension Fund Asset Management recommend that pension entities should establish a sound risk management process that measures and appropriately controls a plan's overall portfolio risk profile. In line with this recommendation, we claim that Swiss pension funds should regularly assess their own riskbearing capacity (I) and have a clearly defined risk budget in terms of a maximum value-at-risk or pre-defined stop loss threshold (1). The risks that pension funds bear are manifold. They can be classified into portfolio risks and plan-specific risks. Portfolio risks essentially comprise investment and market risks, default risks, counterparty risks and liquidity risks. Plan-specific risks include funding risks, actuarial, operational, and regulatory risks, as well as the solvency risk of the plan sponsor. Our Risk Management Score thus rewards pension funds whose risk management framework considers all essential portfolio and plan-specific risk factors (7) 27 • Additionally, since those risk factors have different impact magnitudes on pension entities, their potential detrimental effects need to be assessed on a regular basis by using quantitative risk measurement tools 28 • Quantitative assessments of portfolio risk factors should be conducted on both total portfolio level (1) and per asset management mandate (1). In order to account for adverse actuarial and financial market scenarios, we furthermore assert that stress tests might be valuable tools to include in a plan's risk management framework (1).
Our RIMA Score moreover assigns 1 point to entities that have established a strategic emergency plan for disaster risks (1). Pre-defined guidelines for violations of tactical fluctuation margins can supplement the risk steering process and prevent excessive deviations from the strategic asset allocation (1). The OECD Guidelines on Pension Fund Asset Management moreover stipulate that pension plans should adequately address currency risks when investing in foreign assets. While investments in foreign currencies may benefit a portfolio in terms of diversification aspects and mean-variance optimisation, we argue that, for general risk management reasons, pension funds should have established dear and binding rules concerning the management of foreign exchange risks (1) 29 • Such guidelines can include hedging policies and tools as well as explicit weight thresholds for certain currency exposures.
A6) Monitoring and Transparency Score (MOTR)
Good pension fund governance requires transparency in decision-making as well as ongoing monitoring of investment activities. An effective monitoring process provides objective, decision-relevant information to the board of trustees and enables a timely and systematic measurement of investment performance. To ensure a high degree of objectivity in the investment management process, portfolio performance should be regularly assessed by means of quantitative performance metrics (1) 30
• Quantitative assessment of investment returns should be conducted on both total portfolio level and per asset management mandate in order to obtain a holistic performance picture (1). An independent investment controller who supervises investment actions might support this process (1). Furthermore, comparisons of key performance metrics amongst peer pension plans enables learning from best-performing funds. The Monitoring and Transparency Score therefore assigns 2 points to pension funds that regularly undertake peer group benchmarking regarding administration costs, asset management costs, investment performance and risk structure (2} 31 • A further key issue in pension fund governance is the avoidance of conflicts of interest of board members. Corporate governance regulations in Switzerland require the disclosure of all board members' mandates in the annual report. We argue that this requirement should also apply to pension funds and claim that all mandates of trustee board members should be disclosed in the annual report (1) 32
• Lastly, new legal regulations following the Minder-lnitiative that was passed in March 2013 oblige Swiss pension funds to exercise their shareholder voting rights of portfolio stocks at the companies' annual general meeting. To exercise the rights in the best interests of plan beneficiaries, we stipulate that pension funds should have established a comprehensive information concept for the 29 Article SSe BVV2 requires Swiss pension funds to not invest more than 30 per cent of total plan assets in unhedged foreign currency assets. 30 E.g., such as Jensen's alpha, Sharpe ratio, information ratio, etc. 31 For each element, the score assigns 0.5 points. 32 E.g., such as other trustee board mandates or corporate supervisory board mandates, political offices, etc.
plan members regarding the exercise of their voting rights (1). Lastly, in order to facilitate access to information and hence foster transparency for all stakeholder groups, we argue that a pension fund's annual report should be made available to the general public online (1).
